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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the drawer has a double intent: to make the instrument payable to
the person before him; and to make it payable to the person whom
he believes the impersonator to be. The courts then conclude that
the dominant intent is to transfer title to the person standing before
the drawer.4
The problem then arises as to how to ascertain the intent of a
drawer in the type of situation presented in the instant case, that is,
where the fraudulent imposter represents that he is an agent for a
named principal. In such a case the courts almost unanimously hold
that title does not pass to the person standing before the drawer be-
cause he intends to transfer title only to the supposed agent's prin-
cipal.5 This rule is so whether the principal is an existent or non-
existent person, for the mere fact that there was no such person as
the purported principal does not change the drawer's intent. 6
In the New York cases which have arisen upon similar fact
situations it has also been held that title does not pass to the bogus
agent; the result being that neither a holder in due course nor a
drawee-bank acquires any rights in the instrument.7
The instant case, therefore, is in accord with the authorities both
in other jurisdictions and in New York. The facts clearly showed
that the plaintiff intended to deal with the non-existent corporation,
and not with the purported agents. For this reason the conclusion
in the case was correct, for, as we have seen, the basic test in this
type of case is the drawer's intent.
J.M.N.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF PRESS-RESTRICTION BY
STATUTE.-A criminal complaint charged the defendant with unlaw-
fully publishing and causing to be published in a newspaper the iden-
tity of a certain female who had been raped. A Wisconsin statute
forbade the divulging of such identification.' The lower court, up-
4 Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E.
2d 457 (1937); Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co.,
94 N. J. L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).
5 Bennett v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Cal. App. 450, 190 Pac. 831 (1920);
Moore v. Moultrie Banking Co., 39 Ga. App. 687, 148 S. E. 311 (1929); Dana
v. Old Colony Trust Co., 245 Mass. 347, 139 N. E. 541 (1923).
6 Strang v. Westchester County Nat. Bank, 235 N. Y. 68, 138 N. E. 739
(1923).
7 Strang v. Westchester, supra note 6; United Stores Co. v. American Raw
Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dep't 1918), af'd, 229
N. Y. 532, 129 N. E. 904 (1920).
1 Wis. Stats. § 348.412 (1945) which provides: "Any person who shall
publish or cause to be published in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or cir-
cular, except as the same may be necessary in the institution or prosecution of
any civil or criminal court proceeding, or in the compilation of the records
pertaining thereto, the identity of a female who may have been raped or sub-
jected to any similar criminal assault, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
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holding the defendant's contention, declared the statute unconstitu-
tional and invalid and discharged the defendant. Held, judgment
reversed and cause remanded. The statute is a valid exercise of the
police power and does not violate the constitutional guaranties of the
freedom of the press. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N. W. 2nd
305 (1948).
The defendant's arguments proposed three questions for the
court's determination: (1) Is the statute ". . . sufficiently definite
and certain as not to constitute a denial of due process of law?"
(2) Does it ". . . contain unwarranted classification constituting
a denial of due process of law?" and (3) "Is it a valid exercise of
the police power as against the contention that it violates constitu-
tional guaranties of the freedom of the press ?"
The court after a careful examination of the wording of the stat-
ute, answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in
the negative, disposing of both issues with little difficulty. In dis-
cussing the third question, the court, in view of the defendant's con-
tention that such circumstances as described in the statute did not
create "a clear and present danger" which would justify the legis-
lature in prescribing the limitation on the freedom of the press, sought
to find sufficient cause for granting of the power. The defendant's
argument that the protection of the female victim under the circum-
stances described in the statute is not of sufficient importance to
justify restrictive legislation affecting the constitutional right of the
press because there is no clear and present danger, is supported by
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Herndon v. Lowry-2
and Thomas v. Collins." It was found in the Herndon case that a
Georgia statute 4 violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that it pre-
scribed no reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt and thereby set
vague and indeterminate boundaries to the freedom of speech and
assembly.
In the Thomas case, which concerned state regulation of labor
union organizing, the Supreme Court, in reversing a decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas, declared a Texas statute 5 violated the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
However, though both of these decisions seem to favor the de-
fendant's case, they are not decisive of the issue in the principal case
since the court in both cases did admit that similar though not iden-
county jail for not more than one year or by fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
2 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 81 L. ed. 1066 (1937).
3 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 89 L. ed. 430 (1945).
4 GA. PEN. CODE § 56 (1933) : "Any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise,
to induce others to join in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of
the State shall constitute an attempt to incite insurrection."
5 Tex. Stat. §§ 5-12 (1943) which require labor organizers to register
with and procure an organizer's card from a designated state official before
soliciting membership in labor unions.
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tical legislation might be upheld as constitutional. The court stating
in the Herndon opinion that utterances "inimical to the general wel-
fare" and "involving danger of substantive evil" may be penalized
in the exercise of the state's police power, 6 and that a state's "police
statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbi-
trary or unreasonable 7 attempts to exercise authority vested in the
state in the public interest." In the Thomas case that part of the
Texas court's opinion was upheld which stated that "The State under
its police power may enact laws which interfere indirectly and to a
limited extent with the right of speech or the liberty of the people
where they are reasonably necessary for the protection of the general
public." 8
The court in the principal case supported its holding with the
reasoning of a prior Supreme Court decision,9 and held that the
slight restriction of the freedom of the press prescribed by the statute
is fully justified when the situation of the victim of the assault and
the handicap under which prosecuting officers labor in such cases, is
weighed against the benefit of publishing the identity of the victim in
connection with the details of the crime. This prior case involved a
New Hampshire statute similar to the one in the principal case which
was attacked as violating one's right to freedom of speech. The
Supreme Court therein said: "It has been well observed that such
utterances (those which by their very utterance inflict injury 10 or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace) are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." The Wis-
consin statute was held to have been intended to protect the victim
from embarrassment and offensive publicity which, the court felt, had
a strong tendency to affect her future standing in society. The legis-
lation was thus justified.
D.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SuPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT.-The petitioner
McDonald was convicted on charges of carrying on a lottery known
as the numbers game based on evidence obtained by a search
made without a warrant. Upon trial it appeared that police officers,
having kept McDonald under surveillance for several months, raided
his quarters after one of them unlawfully entered the building through
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Italics ours.
8 See note 3 supra.
9 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 86 L. ed. 1031 (1942).
10 Italics ours.
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